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Rough Terrain Ahead: A New Course for
Racial Preference Programs

I.

INTRODUCTION

Debate over affirmative action has dominated recent legislative and
court agendas. In November 1996, for example, fifty-four percent of
California voters approved a referendum, Proposition 209, which
eliminated preference programs in state and local government for
minorities and women.' Similarly, in 1995 the Board of Regents of the
University of California system ended affirmative action in California's
public universities.' This phenomenon, however, has not limited itself
to California. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Hopwood v.
Texas,3 held that the University of Texas School of Law's admissions
program, which gave preference to African-Americans and MexicanAmericans, violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause.4 A year later, the Houston city council also placed a referendum on the ballot to abolish affirmative action in city contracting.5
Although the voters narrowly defeated this measure, similar proposals
have been made in roughly half the states.' This increasing presence
of affirmative action on the political agenda suggests a growing public
skepticism towards it.'
Bans on preference programs such as these have potentially widespread ramifications. Studies have demonstrated that employers treat

1. Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, 110 F.3d 1431, 1434-35 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 397 (1997).
2. Susan Yoachum et al., UC Scraps Affirmative Action, S.F. CHRoN., July 21, 1995, at

Al.
3. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996).
4. 78 F.3d at 934.
5.

Julie Mason, Voters Keep Affirmative Action ProgramAlive, HOUSTON CHRON., Nov.

5, 1997, at Al.
6. Aaron Epstein, Supreme Court Allows Affirmative Action Ban, ATLANTA J. CONsT.,

Nov. 4, 1997, at Al.
7. Robert J. Donahue, Note, Racial Diversity as a Compelling Gouernmental Interest,
30 IND. L. REv. 523, 524 (1997).

915

916

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

whites differently from blacks with identical education levels and
employment histories." These studies indicate that employers tend to
hire whites over blacks, pay whites higher salaries, and fire whites less
frequently than blacks." In effect, affirmative action programs have
countered this trend and resulted in greater representation of minorities.
When California first implemented its affirmative action program under
then-Governor Ronald Reagan, the composition of higher salary public
work force jobs fell from more than ninety percent white in 1974 to less
than seventy percent white in 1993. Representation of minorities in all
state jobs climbed from 22.7% to 41.8%. By June 1992 California had
achieved parity (the representation proportionate to representation in
the labor market) for African-Americans in sixteen of nineteen job
categories, for Hispanics in seven of nineteen categories, and for Asians
in eleven of nineteen categories. 0 In the category of state contracting,
less than one percent of California's contracts with private businesses
were minority-owned in fiscal year 1989-90. By fiscal year 1992-93,
after the state established a set-aside. program, contracts to minorityowned businesses dramatically increased to 10.1%." With the passage
of Proposition 209, however, a good chance exists that these advances
will cease and that minorities will be under-represented.
Over the last twenty years, the Supreme Court has struggled to define
the constitutional constraints on affirmative action and preference
programs, and case law in this area is still relatively muddled. During
1997, it appeared that the Court would have the chance to clarify the
picture by addressing two cases involving affirmative action. The
Supreme Court had granted certiorari in Taxman v. Board of Education
of the 7ownship of Piscataway,2 a case that involved the discriminatory layoff of a white teacher and retention of an equally qualified black
teacher as part of an attempt to achieve racial diversity. But before oral
arguments in January 1998, the parties settled, mooting the legal
issue."' Similarly, the Court passed an opportunity to test authoritatively the constitutionality of California's Proposition 209 in Coalition

8. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Impact of the Proposed CaliforniaCivil Rights Initiative,
23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 999, 1002 (1996).
9. Id. (referring to a study provided for the California State Legislature. See, e.g.,
Mark Bendick, Jr., Research Evidence on Racial/EthnicDiscriminationfor Affirmative
Action in Employment, in DISCRIMINATION AND AFFIRMATVE ACTION A-61, A-65 (Assembly
Judiciary Comm., Cal. State Legis. 1995)).
10. Id. at 1007.
11. Id. at 1013.
12. 91 F.3d 1547 (3rd Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 2506 (1997).
13. Associated Press, Deal Wards Off Ruling on Rights, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH,
Nov. 22, 1997, at Al.
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For Economic Equity v. Wilson 14 after the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit upheld the California initiative in light of an equal
Consequently, the Ninth Circuit decision is
protection challenge.'
binding law in nearly twenty percent of the states: Alaska, Arizona,
California, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington.
This Comment examines racial preference programs in four different
areas and addresses how the lower federal courts have applied the
Supreme Court standards. Specifically, Part II illustrates the evolution
of the Court's position in equal protection race cases and its current
approach to the use of racial preferences. Part III addresses preference
programs in the realm of state and local construction contracting. Part
IV looks at affirmative action in the public employment sector in terms
of both Title VII and equal protection analyses. Part V addresses
preferential treatment programs in school admissions. Part VI examines
the Court's approach to race-based legislative districting and distinguishes this from the other preference areas. Finally, Part VII suggests a
course the current Supreme Court could take should it choose to hear a
case involving preference programs. This Comment's thesis is that the
courts are taking an increasingly conservative approach to minority
preference programs across the board. It establishes that the standards
the Court has promulgated are exceedingly difficult to satisfy.
II. THE COURT'S APPROACH TO RACIAL PREFERENCE PROGRAMS
The Supreme Court's analysis of racial preference programs really
began with Regents of the University of California v. Bakke"6 when the
Court first addressed the constitutionality of minority preference
admissions policies in higher education.' 7 The facts of Bakke involved
an affirmative action program at the University of California at Davis
Medical School. Under the program the school denied admission to
Allan Bakke, a white applicant with grades and Medical College
Admissions Test scores higher than most admitted minority applicants.'" Without a majority opinion on any litigated issue, a divided
Court partially upheld Bakke's claim that the medical school's affirmative action program violated the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.19 Justice Powell's decisive opinion held
that universities could take into account an applicant's race in certain

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

110 F.3d 1431 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 397 (1997).
110 F.3d at 1448.
438 U.S. 265 (1978).
Id. at 265.
Id. at 276-77.
Id. at 271-72.
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circumstances.'
Because Bakke represented merely a plurality
opinion, it left open the appropriate scrutiny level for analysis of
preferential admissions programs. 1
Justice Powell's swing opinion concluded that the Fourteenth
Amendment applies to all races equally, protecting no one racial group
more than another.22 He refused to interpret the Constitution as
providing more protection to African-Americans and Mexican-Americans
than to whites. Accordingly, he wrote that any type of racial or ethnic
distinction was inherently suspect and required strict scrutiny.'
Under his strict scrutiny analysis, Justice Powell discounted several
goals as failing to be compelling interests. The goals of reducing the
deficit of minorities in medical school,24 combating the effects of societal
discrimination,2" and increasing the number of doctors who will
practice in under-served communities2" were all insufficient. Justice
Powell concluded, however, that one rationale, the promotion of
educational diversity, represented a compelling governmental interest
that satisfied the Constitution.27 In recognizing diversity as a compelling interest, he stated, "The atmosphere of 'speculation, experiment and
creation'-so essential to the quality of higher education-is widely
believed to be promoted by a diverse student body."28
Despite his recognition of diversity as a compelling interest, Justice
Powell qualified its use as a rationale. From his perspective, the
diversity rationale could not be concerned solely with an applicant's race.
For diversity to suffice as a compelling state interest, it would have to
encompass a number of different characteristics of which race was but
a single element.' As a result, colleges and universities could view
race only as a "plus" in the admissions process."0 Because of the

20. Id. at 296 n.36.
21. Id. at 271-72. Justice Powell applied strict scrutiny. Id, at 290. Justices Brennan,
White, Marshall, and Blackmun applied an intermediate level of review. Id. at 359. Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Stevens, and Rehnquist did not address the
constitutionality of the admissions policy because they believed the Title VI issue was
dispositive of the entire claim; thus, they did not apply a scrutiny level. Id. at 412-13. See
also Krista L. Cosner, Comment, Affirmative Action in HigherEducation: Lessons and
Directionsfrom the Supreme Court, 71 IND. L.J. 1003, 1018 (Fall 1996).
22. 438 U.S. at 289-90.
23. Id. at 291.
24. Id. at 307.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 311.
27. Id. at 311-12.
28. Id. at 312.
29. Id. at 315.
30. Id. at 317.
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Court's divisions, however, the Bakke decision did not clarify the picture
surrounding minority preference programs.
The jurisprudential trail moved along two years later in Fullilove v.
Klutznick" when the Court addressed affirmative action in public
contracting programs, but once again the Court failed to garner a
majority. FuIllilove addressed the constitutionality of the Public Works
Employment Act of 1977,82 which required at least ten percent of
federal funds awarded for local public works projects to be set aside to
obtain services from minority businesses.," Although the Court held
the federal program to be facially consistent with the Fifth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause, it did not resolve the scrutiny level question
left open in Bakke.'
Justice Burger justified the program on the
ground that it remedied the present effects of past discrimination. 5
Although Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke rejected preference programs
based on accounting for past societal discrimination, the Fullilove
decision upheld the program because Congress (as opposed to a state
political subdivision in Bakke) had intended that the Act halt the denial
of public contracting opportunities to minority businesses."6
7
In 1986 the Court in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education"
continued on the trail when it again confronted the issue of affirmative
action in employment. This time, however, a majority of the court held
that a termination plan preferring minority teachers over white teachers
with greater seniority violated the Fourteenth Amendment.3" The
majority agreed only on the result. In line with the prior affirmative
action cases, the Court failed to establish a majority on the appropriate
scrutiny level. Justice Powell's plurality opinion applied strict scrutiny

31. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
32. Public Works Employment Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f)(2) (1998).
33. 448 U.S. at 453.
34. Id. at 492. Chief Justice Burger's plurality opinion did not apply a scrutiny level.
Id. at 491-92. Justice Powell's concurrence applied strict scrutiny, and Justice Marshall's

concurrence applied intermediate scrutiny. Id. at 496, 519.
35. Id. at 478.
36. Id. at 473. The program at issue in Fullilove was a pure remedial program as
opposed to the program in Bakke. Id. at 481. Justice Powell's concurrence in Fullilove
recognized this distinction. He maintained that the race-conscious remedy constituted a
compelling interest because: (1) Congress had the authority to respond to the discrimination; and (2) that governmental body had evidence of illegal discrimination. Id. at 498.
Although Fullilove does not answer the scrutiny level question, Justice Powell's
concurrence recognizes that pure remedial programs might constitute a compelling interest
when the federal government institutes them in response to identified discrimination. Id.
at 496.
37. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
38. Id. at 284.

920

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

and required the employer to justify its classification with a compelling
interest and to tailor the plan narrowly to achieve that interest.39 The
plurality opinion reiterated that remedying societal discrimination did
not constitute a compelling interest.' Justice Powell hinted, however,
that remedying the present effects of prior discrimination might be a
compelling interest if the employer has a strong evidentiary basis to
support remedial action.4 '
Finally, less than three years later a marker was laid down on the
trail in City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co.42 There, a majority of the
Court established strict scrutiny as the appropriate inquiry in cases
involving state-created racial preferences.'
In Croson the City of
Richmond mandated that construction companies to which the city
awarded contracts must subcontract at least thirty percent of each
contract to minority- owned subcontractors." Distinguishing Fullilove,
where Congress established the set-aside program, Justice O'Connor's
majority opinion held that the local set aside program in Croson violated
the Fourteenth Amendments Equal Protection Clause.45
The Court found two bases for strict scrutiny in affirmative action
cases: to "'smoke out' illegitimate uses of race" and to reduce the danger
of stigmatic harm.4 Furthermore, the court in Croson reiterated the
constitutional distinctions between remedying past societal discrimination and remedying the present effects of past discrimination as a basis
for affirmative action plans. Citing Wygant, the Court held that only the
latter produces an adequate rationale for race-based classifications
provided that the governmental body imposing the classification
specifically can identify with detailed findings the discrimination within
the affected industry.47 Applying its rule to the facts of Croson, the
Court concluded that Richmond's intent to remedy the present effects of

39.

Id. at 273-74.

40. Id. at 274-76. The Court in Wygant also rejected the "role model" theory (minority
teachers would act as role models for minority students) as a compelling reason for the

classification because it does not "necessarily bear a relationship to the harm caused by
prior discriminatory hiring practices." Id. at 276.

41. Id. at 277. The Court stated that "a public employer like the Board must ensure
that before it embarks on an affirmative-action program, it has convincing evidence that
remedial action is warranted.

That is, it must have sufficient evidence to justify the

conclusion that there has been prior discrimination." Id.
42.
43.

488 U.S. 469 (1989).
Id. at 493-94, 505.

44. Id. at 477. These minority owned subcontractors were called "Minority Business
Enterprises" or "MBEs" for short. Id.
45. Id. at 505.
46. Id. at 493.
47.

1d at 497-500.
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past discrimination was not compelling because Richmond could not
clearly prove past discrimination within the Richmond construction
industry." Furthermore, due to the assumed existence of other raceneutral remedies, such as city financing of small firms, relaxation of
bonding requirements, and simplification of bidding procedures,
Richmond failed to narrowly tailor the program to its objectives.4 9
No sooner had one majority of the Court recognized strict scrutiny as
the correct standard of review for state affirmative action set-aside
programs when another majority of the Court muddled the picture again
in Metro Broadcasting,Inc. v. FCC. 0 Metro Broadcasting addressed
the constitutionality of a federal program that gave preference to
minority controlled radio and television stations applying to the FCC for
broadcast licenses.5 Distinguishing Croson, the new majority applied
an intermediate scrutiny level to congressional programs and held that
the FCC preference rule did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. 2
The majority opinion adopted Justice Marshall's concurrence in Fullilove
as appropriate for congressional programs employing benign racial
classifications."3 Under an intermediate rationale that required only
an important government interest (as opposed to one that was compelling), programming diversity met the lower standard." Referring to
Justice Powell's Bakke opinion, Justice Brennan wrote, "Just as a
'diverse student body' contributing to a 'robust exchange of ideas' is a
'constitutionally permissible goal' on which a race-conscious university
admissions program may be predicated, the diversity of views and
information
on the airwaves serves important First Amendment
55
values."

Metro Broadcasting'suse of intermediate scrutiny was short-lived. In
1995 the Court in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena" partially
overturned Metro Broadcastingand held that "[tlo the extent that Metro
Broadcastingis inconsistent [with the government's need to demonstrate
strict scrutiny] it is overruled."" Like Croson and Fullilove, which

48. Id. at 499-500.
49. Id. at 507.
50. 497 U.S. 547 (1990), overruled in part by Adarand Constructions, Inc. v. Pena, 515
U.S. 200 (1995).
51. 497 U.S. at 557-58.
52. See id. at 564-65.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 566. Because the Court adopted an intermediate scrutiny analysis, it did not
have to address the question of whether diversity is a compelling interest. Id.
55. Id. at 568 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-13).
56. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
57. Id. at 227.
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addressed contracting preferences, Adarand addressed a congressional
program that provided financial incentives to contractors who employed
"disadvantaged" subcontractors, including minority-owned construction
firms."' Justice O'Connor, now with the Croson majority, opined that
Croson had established the correct scrutiny level for racial preference
programs, viewed Metro Broadcasting as straying from established
precedent, and therefore overruled it.59 Although Adarand regularized
the scrutiny level, it did not identify objectives that might serve as
compelling interests. The Court simply remanded the case after it
resolved the scrutiny level question.'
These cases illustrate that although the route to a more conservative
approach to affirmative action has not been linear, its direction is clear.
Following Croson and Adarand, constitutionally permissible preference
programs must satisfy a strict scrutiny analysis. Thus, the program
must reflect a compelling government interest and must be narrowly
tailored to that goal.61 However, what constitutes a compelling interest
remains murky. In his plurality opinion in Bakke, Justice Powell
believed that establishing diversity could be a compelling interest at
least in educational settings.62 But other than Metro Broadcasting,
which Adarand overruled as to its use of intermediate scrutiny and
which concluded that diversity was an important interest, the Court has
not conclusively established diversity as a compelling government
interest. It remains to be seen whether a majority of the Court will
recognize the diversity interest as sufficient to satisfy strict scrutiny. At
this point the case law suggests that remedying the present effects of
past discrimination is the only goal the Court will recognize as
compelling.'
Satisfying this interest represents a difficult hurdle
because Croson requires detailed evidence of past discrimination in the
precise area sought to be remedied." As seen in the cases that follow,
the federal courts rarely have found that a preference program reflects
a compelling interest, nor have they viewed diversity as an alternative
compelling interest.

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 207-10.
Id. at 227.
Id. at 239.
488 U.S. at 507, 510.
See 438 U.S. at 312-13.
See, e.g., Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277; Croson, 488 U.S. at 497-500.

64. 488 U.S. at 499-500.
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PREFERENCES IN CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTING

Three cases decided in 1996 and 1997 represent post-Adarand
decisions and reflect the federal court's approach to remedial preference
programs in construction contracting. In September 1997, the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit relied on Croson and Adarand in the case
of Monterey Mechanical Co. v. Wilson.6 Monterey addressed California
Polytechnic State University's solicitation of bids for the construction of
a new heating and air conditioning system. The university disqualified
the low bid by a white-owned contracting firm because it did not comply
with a California statute that required general contractors to meet a
goal of subcontracting fifteen percent of the work to minority business
enterprises ("MBEs") or to make a good faith effort to do so." The
court held that the statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause. 7
The court's analysis is significant because it determined that a
nonrigid system of goals and good faith efforts constitutes a classification
under the Equal Protection Clause and receives the same strict scrutiny
analysis as that used for strict quotas." Although California's statute
required only good faith efforts to meet the goals, the good faith
requirement still treated contractors differently according to their
ethnicity and sex. Minority-owned general contractors were not required
to make any good faith attempts to subcontract to minority-owned
subcontractors, but white-owned general contractors were mandated to
make good faith efforts to subcontract to MBEs.6 9 This resulted in
compliance expenses incurred by white-owned contractors that minorityowned general contractors did not have to pay. 0
After the Ninth Circuit determined that the good faith preference
system must satisfy strict scrutiny, the court applied the Croson and
Adarand standards to the statutory scheme. The state government was
unable to offer any evidence that the university or even the State of
California had previously discriminated against minority contractors.

65. 125 F.3d 702 (9th Cir. 1997).
66. Id. at 704.
67. Id. at 715.
68. Id. at 710-12.
69. Id. at 709.
70. Id. The nonminority bidders must contact state and federal agencies and minority
organizations in order to identify prospective subcontractors. They also must produce
advertisements targeted at minority subcontractors. These efforts require time, effort, and
expense. Id.
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This violated the Supreme Court's mandate in Croson and Adarand.7 '
California offered only legislative findings that MBEs held an economically disadvantaged position. The court determined that these legislative findings were insufficiently compelling.72 Moreover, the program
failed because it was not narrowly tailored and included minority groups
against whom the California construction industry was extremely
unlikely to have discriminated.7 3
In September 1997 the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
reviewed a similar case in Engineering Contractors Ass'n of South
Florida,Inc. v. MetropolitanDade County.74 Dade County promulgated
an affirmative action program that established county construction
participation goals of fifteen percent for black business enterprises
("BBEs") and nineteen percent for Hispanic business enterprises
("HBEs").7" The county had five measures it could use to meet these
participation goals: set asides, subcontractor goals, project goals, bid
preferences, and selection factors.7" Unlike the plan in Monterey
Mechanical in which nonminority general contractors had the duty to
make a good faith effort to subcontract to MBEs, the plan in Engineering
Contractors required the county to meet the goals (via one of the five
methods). The process resulted in the county passing over certain
nonminority contractors and subcontractors in the award of contracts.
The court held that the program violated the Equal Protection Clause.77
The crux of EngineeringContractorsinvolved the court's determination
of whether the county produced sufficient evidence as required by Croson
to show discrimination within the Dade County construction industry.
Dade County presented both statistical evidence and anecdotal evidence
71. Id. at 713-14.
72. 1d& at 714.
73. Id. Like the statute in Croson, the California statute included groups such as
Aleuts and Eskimos. While these groups have suffered oppression, the court stated that
"it would be frivolous to suggest that California State Polytechnic University ... or the
State of California, have actively or passively discriminated against Aleuts in the award
of construction contracts." Id
74. 122 F.3d 895 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1186 (1998).
75. EngineeringContractor's,122 F.3d at 901. Dade County also had an eleven percent
goal for women business enterprises. Id. EngineeringContractorsspeaks to this issue in
its analysis; however, this Comment does not address affirmative action as it relates to
gender.
76. Id. A set aside reserves a contract for bidding solely among MBEs. A subcontractor goal requires a general contractor to subcontract a certain percentage of work to MBEs.
A project goal creates a pool of MBE subcontractors, and the county selects firms from this
pool to carry out portions of the contract. A bid preference actually reduces an MBE bid
price for purposes of determining the lowest bid. A selection factor is similar to a bid
preference but uses factors besides price. Id
77. Id. at 929.
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of discrimination within the metropolitan area's construction industry.7
The statistical evidence included contracting statistics, subcontracting
statistics, marketplace data statistics, and two studies. The contracting
statistics showed disparities between the bids made by MBEs and the
actual percentage of contract dollars awarded to MBEs. The construction industry countered this evidence, however, by providing a raceneutral reason for the disparity: because MBEs were smaller than
majority firms, they received smaller contracts.79 The subcontracting
statistics also pointed to a disparity in contracts awarded to minority
subcontractors, and the marketplace data statistics indicated that the
construction market was responsible for unfavorable disparities.'
Despite persuasive statistics, the court also discounted them based in
part on plaintiff's evidence that the methodology was flawed.81
In addition, Dade County presented two studies: the Wainwright and
the Brimmer studies. The Wainwright study concluded that as a result
of present and past discrimination, minorities are less likely to own
construction businesses.8 2 Relying on Croson, the court rejected the
Wainwright study because (1) the lack of minority participation was not
necessarily due to discrimination in the construction industry, and (2)
other reasons could explain the dearth of minority-owned construction
M The Brimmer study concluded that a disparity existed in
companies."
the business receipts from black-owned construction firms and whiteowned construction firms in Dade County. The court also rejected this
study for failing to account for the smaller size of black-owned construction companies."
The plaintiff's anecdotal evidence attempted to present a picture of
discrimination. Owners of minority construction firms and two county
employees testified that they believed discrimination persisted in the
M The Eleventh Circuit concluded
Dade County construction industry."
that anecdotal evidence alone rarely will be sufficient to establish
discrimination within the construction industry, but it can be used to

78. Id. at 912-13, 924-25.
79. Id. at 916.
80. Id. at 919-20.
81. Id. at 920-21. The subcontracting statistics involved firms that performed the
majority of their work outside Dade County. Thus, these statistics were "not a reasonable
way to measure Dade County subcontracting participation." Id at 920. The marketplace
data statistics arguably were flawed because the study included firms that were
unqualified to perform certain county construction contracts. Id. at 921.
82. Id at 921-22.
83. Id. at 922.
84. ld. at 923.
85. Id. at 924.
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supplement statistical evidence." Nonetheless, because the statistical
evidence was weak the district court's assessment of the anecdotal
evidence as insufficient was not clearly erroneous. 7 Consequently, the
court held that the program was unconstitutional.'
EngineeringContractorsillustrates the difficulty of proving discrimination within the construction industry There is often a lack of data to
satisfy the burden. Much discriminatory behavior, both past and
present, is not documented. Even when the government presents
persuasive statistics and studies, the opponent frequently can take
advantage of various flaws in them. A proponent of a preference
program has a seemingly insurmountable burden in satisfying the
compelling interest requirement of Croson and Adarand.
Nevertheless, the next case, ContractorsAss'n of Eastern Pennsylvania, Inc. u. City of Philadelphia,9 suggests how the government might
satisfy its evidentiary burden based upon rationales that are not
predicated entirely on pure remedial programs. In ContractorsAss'n, the
City of Philadelphia established a set-aside program for AfricanAmerican contractors."c Ultimately, the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit held that the program violated the Equal Protection Clause
because the program was not narrowly tailored.91 Before rejecting the
plan under the narrow-tailoring prong, however, the court addressed
whether Philadelphia had a compelling interest for its program.
In its attempt to satisfy the Croson evidentiary standard, Philadelphia
argued that three different forms of discrimination had worked against
minority contractors.
First, Philadelphia presented evidence of
discrimination by prime contractors in the selection of minority
subcontractors. 2 The court rejected this for lack of sufficient evidence:
city records (project engineer logs), which provided the only evidence of
such discrimination, failed to record whether a subcontractor was an
MBE. Moreover, the evidence only used a random sampling of the
logs.98
86. Id. at 925-26.
87. Id. at 926.
88. Id. at 929. In rejecting the program, the court also determined that the affirmative

action program was not narrowly tailored because Dade County failed to seriously consider
race-neutral measures to increase minority participation in the county construction
industry. Id. at 927.
89. 91 F.3d 586 (3rd Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 953 (1997).
90. 91 F.3d at 591.
91. Id. at 606.
92. Id. at 599.
93. Id. at 600. The study was based on only twenty-five to thirty percent of the City's
Procurement Department's project engineer logs. Moreover, the only basis for identifying
a name on the log as an MBE was based on the memory of the person who conducted the
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Second, Philadelphia presented evidence that local trade associations
had a low representation of MBEs." The court cited Croson and stated
that evidence of low membership by MBEs in trade associations,
standing alone, is insufficient to support a remedial preference
program."' It also determined that the study contained flaws because
no black contractor who had applied to the contractor association had
been denied membership. Furthermore, even if the study could show
that the contractor association did discriminate, this would not justify
a preference program because the city did not participate in the
discrimination and did not require membership in the association for the
award of a contract."
Finally, Philadelphia presented evidence of past discrimination by the
city in the award of prime contracts. This evidence included a disparity
index score of 22.5, which showed the disparity in the city's award of
prime contracts.9 7 Based on this score, the city would have to award
minority construction firms 4.5 times more dollars than they actually
received in order to achieve an amount proportionate to their representation among all Philadelphia construction companies."' The court
responded much more favorably to this evidence and rejected the
proposed limitations on the study." Although Croson requires the

study. Id.
94. Id. at 601. Dr. Brimmer, who conducted one of the studies used in Engineering
Contractors, also conducted the study in Contractors Association that concluded that
contractor associations discriminated against MBEs. Id.
95. Id. (citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 503).
96. Id. at 601-02.
97. Id- at 602. A disparity index compares the amount of contracts a group receives
to the amount that would be expected based on that group's bidding activity and awardee
success rate. Specifically, it measures the participation of a specific group's participation
in the award of contracts by dividing that group's contract dollar percentage (percent the
specific group of bidders comprises compared to the total number of bidders) by the
awardee percentage (percent of contracts actually awarded to that group), and then
multiplies that number by 100%. For example, if MBEs represent 10% of the bidders and
are awarded 5% of the contract dollars, the disparity index would be: (contract dollar %
/ awardee %)x 100% = (5% / 10%) x 100% = .5 x 100% = 50%. The closer the index score
is to 100%, the greater that group's participation in construction contracts. Generally,
disparity index numbers of 80% or more are not considered indications of discrimination.
Engineering Contractors Ass'n v. Metro Dade County, 122 F.3d at 914. A disparity index
of 22.5% may establish a strong evidentiary basis for inferring discrimination. Contractors
Ass'n v. City of Philadelphia, 91 F.3d at 602.
98. ContractorsAssn, 91 F.3d at 602.
99. Id. at 602-03. The contractor association claimed that the study was flawed
because it (1) was not limited to whether black firms were qualified to perform certain
contracting work, (2) provided mixed data from different sources, and (3) did not account
for instances when black firms were too busy with other federal projects to allow them to
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evidence to show discrimination against the minority group that is
capable of performing the relevant work (that is, showing discrimination
against qualified blacks in the construction industry), the court stated,
"An analysis is not devoid of probative value simply because it may
theoretically be possible to adopt a more refined approach."'4 Because
the court later decided that the plan was not narrowly tailored, it was
unnecessary to decide whether this evidence was sufficient. However,
the court hinted that it might be for future programs."0 '
Ultimately, the court held that Philadelphia's remedial plan violated
the Equal Protection Clause requirement that the plan be narrowly
Several factors led to this conclusion. The evidence
tailored."°
suggested that the city discriminated against prime contractors, yet the
In addition, the
program effectively applied only to subcontractors.'
fifteen percent goal was focused on the number of minorities in the
general population and not the number of minority-owned contracting
firms. In fact, the evidence indicated that only 0.7% of the construction
companies capable of performing city prime contracts were black."'
While the court did not require that the percentage of the preferred
group in the industry be a ceiling, it believed that the fifteen percent
mark was not necessary to remedy discrimination.0 5 Finally, as in
EngineeringContractors,Philadelphia did not pursue any race-neutral
alternatives.e 6
Although the case law has not conclusively established diversity as a
rationale for preference programs, ContractorsAssociation suggests that
it is possible to create diversity in the contracting industry under the
high standards of Croson and Adarand. Philadelphia could have
implemented race-neutral measures to reduce the barriers that minority

perform city projects. Id. at 603.

100. Id. at 603.
101. See id. at 605. However, the court suggests that if Philadelphia should decide to
craft a new preference plan that is more narrowly tailored, it might want to use this
evidence to justify the program. Id. at 605 n.22.
102. Id. at 606. Before commencing the narrow tailoring analysis, the court specified
that based on Croson, the degree of fit of a remedial program is important for three
reasons. First, the lack of a close fit casts doubt on the claim that remedying the identified

discrimination and injury was the legislature's objective. Second, a race-based preference
imposes a burden on all citizens who are protected by the Equal Protection Clauses.
Finally, the program's favored class can be burdened by the preference through the danger
of stigmatic harm. I& at 605-06.
103. Id. at 606.
104. Id at 607.
105. Id. at 608.
106. Id.
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firms face in entering the city construction market. 7 The city could
have reduced qualification and bonding requirements. It also could have
established training programs and provided financial assistance for all
disadvantaged contractors regardless of race."° A race-neutral plan
would apply to all groups, such as small construction firms. While
diversity would not represent the plan's primary impetus, the plan
would have a permissible secondary effect of creating diversity within
the construction industry. Thus, by creating race-neutral measures, the
city could still aid both existing and start-up minority firms who faced
barriers to market entry. A race-neutral plan could achieve diversity
without disadvantaging nonminority-owned companies and without the
dangers of remedial preference programs thatCroson highlights.
ContractorsAssociation also suggests that if race-neutral measures
fail, Philadelphia possibly could take the next step of implementing a
narrow preference plan targeted at minorities. In so doing, the city
would need to reduce the percentage goal of minority representation. In
addition, it would need to target only prime contractors because the
evidence demonstrated discrimination only with prime contractors.'09
The lesson of ContractorsAssociation seems to be that governments must
first experiment with race-neutral measures.
IV. PREFERENCES IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT
In 1996 and 1997, the courts decided two cases in the area of public
employment that have struck a blow to affirmative action. The first
case, Taxman v. Board of Education of the Township of Piscataway,"0
addressed the layoff of a white teacher-and retention of an equally
qualified minority teacher-in order to achieve racial diversity. The
parties were scheduled to argue the case before the Supreme Court in
January 1998; instead, they entered into a settlement while the case was
pending. The second case, Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson,...
concerned California's Proposition 209, a state ballot measure that ended
the use of affirmative action by the state. 12 The Supreme Court

107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. 607-08.
110. 91 F.3d 1547 (3rd Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 2506 (1997).
111. 110 F.3d 1431 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 397 (1997).
112. The affirmative action ban applies to state hiring, contracting, and education.
However, this Comment analyzes the case in the section concerning employment preference
programs.
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declined to review it."' Both cases now are binding in their respective
circuits.
In Taxrnan the Board of Education of Piscataway, New Jersey
developed an affirmative action policy in 1975 for employment decisions.
The plan established a tie-breaking system: when two equally qualified
candidates applied for a job, the school board would recommend the
minority candidate for the position. 14 As part of a down-sizing effort
in 1989, the school board reduced the teaching staff of the business
department at Piscataway High School by one teacher. Considering two
equally qualified and senior business teachers, one African-American
and the other white, the board applied the affirmative action plan and
retained the African-American teacher. Consequently, the white teacher,
Sharon Taxman, sued the school board for a violation of Title VII."
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the affirmative
L"
action plan used to lay off Taxman violated Title VII.
But because
this case involved Title VII, it required a different analysis than that
used in equal protection cases. The Third Circuit used United Steelworkers v. Weber. 7 as the basis for its decision."" Weber concluded
that Title VII's prohibitions against racial discrimination do not
proscribe all voluntary race-based preference plans."' Rather, the
Court in Weber held that the permissibility of the plan depended on (1)
the goal of breaking down old patterns of racial segregation, (2) avoiding
unnecessarily trammeling
the interests of white employees, and (3) its
120
temporary nature.
The court in Taxman first determined that the school board's
affirmative action plan lacked a remedial purpose; in fact, it was used
only to achieve diversity.121 African-American teachers were never under-

113. Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, 118 S. Ct. 397 (1997).

114. Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1550.
115. Id. at 1552. "Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment' or 'to limit, segregate, or classify his employees... in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise affect
his status as an employee.'" Id. at 1553 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)). Taxman also
asserted a claim under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination. 91 F.3d at 1552.
116. Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1567.
117. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
118. Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1550. The circuit court also applied Johnson v. Transporta.
tion Agency, Santa Clara County, California, 480 U.S. 616 (1987), which refined Weber's
holding in a Title VII gender discrimination case. See 91 F.3d at 1555-64.
119. 443 U.S. at 208.
120. Id.
121. 91 F.3d at 1550-52.
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represented nor underutilized in the Piscataway school system.122 On this score the school board had a good history. By retaining
the African-American teacher and laying off the white teacher, the
school board's aim was forward-looking: it wanted to keep the teaching
staff culturally diverse. 23
As under the Equal Protection Clause when the remediation of the
present effects of past discrimination represents the only recognized
compelling interest, the Third Circuit held that Title VII requires an
affirmative action plan to have a remedial purpose."2 It rejected the
claim that Title VII was also intended to promote racial diversity.25
In so doing, the court first determined that equal protection standards
It then
under the Constitution do not necessarily satisfy Title VII.'
concluded that even if Title VII incorporated the equal protection
standards, the Equal Protection Clause does not recognize racial
diversity as a goal.'27 It cited Wygant for the proposition that the
government must show evidence of prior discrimination by an employer
and that the "'role model'" theory (minority teachers would be role
models for minority students) was an insufficient justification for a
preference program."m Moreover, it also rejected Bakke's diversity
rationale. The court distinguished Bakke because the university's
interest in a diverse student body implicated additional First Amendment concerns that were not present in Taxman." 9 In addition, the
court indicated that Bakke's diversity rationale required preference
programs to view diversity as one of a number of factors to consider. 80
Finally, the court determined that the programming diversity interest
in Metro Broadcastinghad nothing to do with the concerns that support
Title VII.L "s
After concluding that Title VII advances no diversity interest and is
concerned solely with remedial preference plans, the Third Circuit

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 1550.
Id. at 1552.
Id. at 1557.
Id. at 1560.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1560-61 (citing Wygant, 476 U.S. at 270-78).
Id. at 1561-62 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312-13). According to Justice Powell, the

First Amendment is concerned about"the atmosphere of'speculation, experiment and creation'" that is an essential quality of higher education and that is "widely believed to be
promoted by a diverse student body." Id. at 1562 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312). In
effect, in Bakke diversity would be used to achieve a greater goal-fulfilling the interests
of the First Amendment. Id.
130. Id. at 1562 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315).
131. Id. at 1562-63.
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examined the school board's plan in light of Weber. Because the school
board admitted the nonremedial nature of its affirmative action plan, the
plan automatically failed the first prong of Weber.1
The court also
held that the plan unnecessarily trammeled on nonminority interests
because the plan had no benchmarks or goals in terms of the number of
minorities to hire. Without standards to evaluate the plan's progress,
no assurance existed that the plan did not exceed its purpose."
Finally, the affirmative action plan was not temporary. Rather, the
school board adopted the policy in 1975, did not establish a duration for
it, and could implement it any time it sought to achieve diversity."
Although the court rejected the affirmative action plan under Title VII
because of its nonremedial nature, the court applauded the principles
and goals of diversity the plan strived to achieve.1"
On November 21, 1997, civil rights groups paid $433,500 to settle the
suit before the Supreme Court heard oral arguments."" Civil rights
groups including the NAACP, the Black Leadership Forum, and the
Southern Christian Leadership Conference raised this money out of
concern that the Court decision could severely hamper racial preference
programs. These groups believed Taxman failed to present the strongest
case in favor of affirmative action that the Court could use to establish
precedent. National Urban League president Hugh Price stated, "It
won't be easy but we need to make sure the fairest and strongest case
possible is laid out to the court. This wasn't the right case."" 7 As a
result of the settlement, the Taxman holding remains binding authority
in the Third Circuit.
In April 1997 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed
affirmative action in Coalition for Economic Equity, but it went beyond
Taxman's Title VII analysis because it arose not as an employment
discrimination challenge but in an equal protection context. Coalition
for Economic Equity resulted from California voters' approval of
Proposition 209, a state constitutional amendment that prohibits all
public affirmative action programs."
After the voters passed the

132.
133.

Id. at 1563.
Id. at 1564. Without goals, the school board is free to grant racial preferences at

its whim. In fact, the board could pursue its diversity policy and use its affirmative action
plan to discriminate against individuals who Title VII was intended to protect. Id.
134. Id.

135. Id. at 1567.
136. Associated Press, Deal Wards Off Ruling on Rights, RICHMOND TIMES-DI5PATCH,
Nov. 22, 1997, at Al.
137.

Associated Press, Groups Saw Teacher Case as Wrong One for Precedent,

RICHMOND TIMEs-DISPATCH, Nov. 22, 1997, at A7.
138. 110 F.3d at 1434.
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referendum, plaintiffs brought suit in federal district court seeking a
temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. The trial
court entered a temporary restraining order and granted a preliminary
injunction in December 1996.1" The state appealed to the Ninth
Circuit for a stay of the injunction, but the court deferred submission of
the stay application. Instead, the court ruled on the merits underlying
the preliminary injunction itself.' ° Ultimately, the court held that the
prohibition on affirmative action violated neither the Equal Protection
Clause nor Title VII. 4
In its decision the court applied both a "conventional" equal protection
analysis and a "political structure" equal protection analysis. 42 The
"conventional" analysis examined the substance of Proposition 209 while
the "political structure" analysis examined the level of government that
enacted Proposition 209." First addressing the conventional analysis,
the court determined that the strict scrutiny standard established in
Croson and Adarand applied. The court quickly disposed of the issue
because it concluded that Proposition 209 did not even create a
In fact, Proposition 209 did just the opposite; it
classification.1'
prohibited the state from classifying individuals by race or gender.
Accordingly, Proposition 209 did not violate the Equal Protection Clause
in the conventional sense, and the court did not have to use the strict
scrutiny analysis. 4"
In contrast, the political structure equal protection claim presented a
more difficult and obscure challenge to the court. Essentially, the
plaintiffs argued that Proposition 209 resulted in an unequal political
structure that denies minorities and women the right to seek preferenThe court cited
tial treatment from lower levels of government."
several precedents that spoke to political structure equal protection
challenges. In Hunter v. Erickson,47 the Akron, Ohio City Council
amended its charter to prevent the city council from enacting ordinances
concerning housing discrimination without city voter approval. There,
the Supreme Court found that the amendment created a racial
classification that treated racial housing matters differently from other

139. Id. at 1435 (referring to Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480
(N.D. Cal. 1996)).
140. Id. at 1436.
141. Id. at 1448. This Comment does not focus on the court's Title VII analysis.
142. Id at 1438-39.

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id at 1439.
Id. at 1440.
Id.
Id.
393 U.S. 385 (1969).
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racial and housing concerns. Consequently, the amendment resulted in
an unconstitutional political structure that disadvantaged racial
minorities by making it more difficult to enact legislation on their
behalf.' "
Similarly, in Washington v. Seattle School District No.
1,149 a ballot initiative prevented school boards from assigning students
beyond their neighborhood schools. A number of exceptions existed, but
they all effectively prevented busing to desegregate schools."s° The
Court determined that the initiative resulted in a political structure that
violated the Equal Protection Clause because it established a racial
classification by removing "'the authority to address a racial problem...
from the existing decisionmaking body, in such a way as to burden
minority interests.'"'1 The court in Coalition for Economic Equity
interpreted Hunter and Washington as prohibiting states from allowing
higher levels of government to exercise decision making authority over
various racial questions. However, it never recognized these decisions
as concluding that the repeal of legislation benefitting minorities violates
equal protection."' 2
Using these precedents, the Ninth Circuit distinguished the equal
protection argument raised in Coalition for Economic Equity. The
plaintiffs argued that Hunter and Washington prevented California from
withdrawing the jurisdiction of local governments to permit preference
programs.15
The court disagreed and held that the state must
reallocate political authority in a racially discriminatory way before the
Hunter doctrine will apply.'" Because Proposition 209 prevents the
state or localities from discriminating against anyone or providing
preferences to anyone, it is a race-neutral law.'
Moreover, a restructuring of the political process will violate equal protection only when it
hampers a person's right to equal treatment.'" According to the court,
Proposition 209 does not impede an individual's right to equal treatment;
rather, it impedes an individual's ability to receive preferential treatment, which does not violate the Equal Protection Clause.'57 The

148. Economic Equity, 110 F.3d at 1440 (citing Hunter,393 U.S. at 390-93).
149. 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
150. Economic Equity, 110 F.3d at 1440 (citing Washington, 458 U.S. at 462-63).

151. Id. at 1441 (quoting Washington, 458 U.S. at 474).
152. Id. at 1443. In fact, Crawfordv. Board of Education,458 U.S. 527, 538-39 (1982),
held that the repeal of desegregation laws does not embody an invalid racial classification
and fails to violate the Equal Protection Clause. 110 F.3d at 1443.
153. 110 F.3d at 1443.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1444.
156. Id. at 1445.
157. Id.
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Equal Protection Clause establishes a burden on preferences. Based on
Adarand, the court held that for an individual to receive preferential
treatment without violating equal protection, a compelling interest must
support it.'
The court emphasized that the Constitution does not
require preferential programs. 9 Consequently, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that Proposition 209 does not violate political structure equal
protection.6 4
Needless to say, the ramifications of Taxman and Coalition for
Economic Equity run deep and go beyond the employment sphere. They
provide a green light for certain states to prohibit remedial preference
programs. Coalitionfor Economic Equity establishes one circuit's view
that the Constitution does not require affirmative action programs.
Furthermore, both cases illustrate that achieving diversity is not a
constitutional mandate. These cases reflect a growing shift in attitude
concerning the significance of remedial preferences. Although binding
only in their respective circuits, they also provide a model that future
courts may follow, including, perhaps, the Supreme Court.
V.

PREFERENCES IN HIGHER EDUCATION

The circuit courts also have cut the breadth of affirmative action in
the realm of public university admissions. For the 1992 school year, the
University of Texas School of Law applied its preference program and
denied admission to four white applicants who had better grades and
Law School Aptitude Test scores than a number of accepted minority
applicants. 1 ' In Hopwood v. Texas, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit held that the law school may not use race as an admissions
factor in order to: (1) achieve a diverse student body, (2) combat the
perceived effects of a hostile environment, (3) alleviate the law school's
poor reputation in the minority community, and (4) eliminate the

158. Id. at 1446.
159. Id.
160. Id161. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932,938 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996).
The law school based admissions on a 'Texas Index" number, which was comprised of an
applicant's undergraduate grade point average and Law School Admissions Test score. 78
F.3d at 935. For resident whites and nonpreferred minorities, the law school usually
considered 199 to be the minimum presumptive admit score and 192 to be the maximum
presumptive deny score. But as part of the school's policy to admit more AfricanAmericans and Mexican-Americans, the school reduced these two scores to 189 (presumptive admit) and 179 (presumptive deny). Id. at 936. The white plaintiffs had scores
ranging from 199 to 197, but the law school rejected all four applicants. Id. at 938.
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present effects of past discrimination by parties other than the law
school."
The court began its opinion by addressing the purpose of the Equal
Protection Clause and concluded that discrimination based on any race
is highly questionable." Consequently, a plurality of the Fifth Circuit
looked to Wygant, Croson, and Adarand and applied strict scrutiny to
the racial preference.'" It rejected the goals of diversity and remedying the present effects of past discrimination by the University of Texas
1
system and the Texas educational system as compelling interests. '
In discounting diversity as a compelling interest, the court refused to
abide by Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke recognizing diversity as an
interest.' The court noted that Justice Powell's swing vote in Bakke
received no other votes and that with the exception of Metro Broadcasting (which was later overruled in part on other grounds), no other case
recognized diversity as a compelling interest."6 Rather, the use of
race to establish diversity contradicts the
goals of the Equal Protection
16
Clause in that it fosters the use of race. 8
While the court also rejected the law school's attempt to remedy the
present effects of past discrimination in the University of Texas system
and the Texas educational systems, it did not discount that remedying
the present effects of past discrimination could be a compelling interest
in certain limited situations.'
Referring to Croson, the court held
that the use of remedial preferences must be restricted to the state actor
who had previously discriminated. 70 Because the admissions policy
attempted to remedy either discrimination within the University of
Texas system or the entire Texas state educational system, it was too
expansive and not sufficiently related to past harms within the law
school.17 1 In addition, the court claimed that the three alleged effects
of prior discrimination-(1) the reputation that the law school was a
"white" school, (2) the under-representation of minorities at the law
school, and (3) the perception that the law school was a hostile
environment for minorities-were only effects of societal discrimination,

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

78 F.3d at 962.
Id at 939-40.
Id. at 940.
Id. at 944, 954.
Id. at 944.
Id.
Id. at 945.
Id. at 951.
Id. at 950, 954 (citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 499).
Id at 951 & n.43.
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as opposed to effects of prior discrimination in the law school.1 2 Only
if the law school could prove prior discrimination within the law school
itself might the admissions policy satisfy a compelling interest.17
Because the majority determined that the admissions policy failed to
constitute a compelling interest, it did not address whether the program
was narrowly tailored. 174 However, the concurrence believed the court
could have taken a more restricted approach by rejecting the program
7 5 It maintained that the court should
for not being narrowly tailored."
not have declared Bakke's diversity rationale dead, and it refused to find
that diversity in higher education could never be a compelling interest. 171 Consequently, the concurrence shifted its analysis and determined that the law school's sole focus on African-Americans and
Mexican-Americans caused the program to be underinclusive.177 If the
law school sought to achieve diversity, it should not have ignored other
minority groups that could contribute to diversity.78 To the concurrence, the admissions program resembled a quota system for AfricanAmericans and Mexican-Americans rather than a narrowly tailored
7 " In July 1996
admissions policy attempting to seek true diversity."
s
Consequently,
the Supreme Court declined to review Hopwood."
Hopwood is binding in Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi, the states that
comprise the Fifth Circuit.
A second case involving racial preference programs in education is
Podberesky v. Kirwan, 8' which arose out of the Fourth Circuit. In
Podberesky the court had to apply the evolving case doctrine on minority
preference programs to a University of Maryland scholarship program
open only to African-American students.'8 2 The Fourth Circuit applied
the strict scrutiny standard and rejected the scholarship prgram."
The University alleged that four present effects of past discrimination
existed at the school: (1) a poor reputation within the African-American
community, (2) an under-representation of African-Americans in the
student population, (3) a low retention rate for African-American

172. Id. at 952.
173. Id. at 954.
174. Id. at 955.
175. Id. at 962 (Weiner, J., specially concurring).

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id. at 964.
Id. at 966.
Id.
Id.
Texas v. Hopwood, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996) (mem.).
38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1128 (1995).
38 F.3d at 151.
Id. at 161.
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students, and (4) an atmosphere hostile to African-American students.' " Thus, the University viewed the scholarship program as
remedying those present effects. 5 However, the court refused to
recognize any of the effects as being sufficient to justify the scholarship
program."
Concerning the poor reputation and the effects of the
hostile environment, the court held that knowledge of historical fact is
not a present effect that can justify a race-exclusive remedy."8 7 In
terms of the remaining two effects, the University failed to demonstrate
that the under-representation and higher attrition rate were connected
to the prior discrimination."' As in Hopwood, the Supreme Court
by public
refused to hear an appeal; thus, race-based scholarships offered
89
universities are unconstitutional in the Fourth Circuit.'
Hopwood and Podberesky appear to make the remedying of the present
effects of past discrimination virtually impossible." ° Both courts
refused to view the admissions programs as doing anything more than
remedying past societal discrimination."9' But as a result, both
decisions could have an impact on university admissions that may soon
reach beyond their circuits.
VI. RACE-BASED DISTRICTING
Race-based legislative districting is not an affirmative action plan.
However, it is similar to affirmative action and preference programs in
that legislatures create districts with the distinct purpose of keeping
minorities in a voting majority. This Comment discusses race-based
districting due to the similarity between preference programs and
districting that preserves minority voting strength. Just as with
affirmative action, race-based districting calls into play the Equal
Protection Clause. Nevertheless, the Court's analysis of "gerrymandered" districts goes one step beyond the typical strict scrutiny approach
used for contracting, employment, or education. This Part briefly
explains the two seminal cases that establish the constitutional
parameters for drawing election districts. It then discusses a recent
application of these rules.

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id. at 152.
Id.
Id. at 151.
Id. at 154.
Id. at 155.
Kirwan v. Podberesky, 514 U.S. 1128 (1995).
78 F.3d at 952; 38 F.3d at 153, 157.
Id.
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Shaw v. Reno 92 addressed North Carolina's redrawn congressional
districts after the 1990 census results provided the state an additional
The North
seat in the United States House of Representatives.'
Carolina General Assembly reapportioned the state and included two
majority-black congressional districts. One of the districts covered the
northern part of North Carolina's coastal plain, where the largest
concentration of African-Americans live, but extended to near the South
Carolina boarder. The second district was even more amorphous and
noncompact. It ran for approximately 160 miles, but in many portions
it was no wider than the interstate highway.'
The Court held that if the redistricting plan is "so irrational on its face
that it can be understood only as an effort to segregate voters into
separate voting districts because of their race," it may violate the Equal
Protection Clause. 95 Once this finding is made, a court must apply
strict scrutiny analysis and determine whether a compelling interest
exists for the plan and whether the plan is narrowly tailored.' The
Court determined that racial gerrymanders reinforce the stereotype that
members of the same racial groups favor the same candidates and
political interests.' 7 As a result, gerrymanders "bear[] an uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid."'"0 Moreover, individuals
elected from these districts are more likely to believe that they must
represent members of the racial group that elected them as opposed to
the entire constituency."* The Court never decided whether the
districting scheme satisfied a compelling state interest and was narrowly
tailored; rather, it remanded the case for this determination. 20
Although Shaw did not determine whether a bizarre shape is
necessary for an equal protection violation, Miller v. Johnson20 '
established that a strange district shape is not a requirement for an
equal protection claim. 20 Miller arose in response to Georgia's
redistricting following the 1990 census. Of eleven districts, Georgia

192.

509 U.S. 630 (1993).

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Id. at 633.
Id. at 635-36.
Id. at 658.
Id.
Id. at 647.
Id.
Id. at 648.
Id. at 657-58.
515 U.S. 900 (1995).
Id at 912.
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established three majority-minority districts.' 3 One of these majorityblack districts connected Atlanta to parts of Savannah, ran 260 miles,
and covered 6,784 square miles.2
A plurality of the Court determined that the shape of the district is
not dispositive of whether the district violates the Equal Protection
Clause. 5 However, it recognized the relevancy of shape because it
may provide circumstantial evidence that the legislature viewed race as
the controlling rationale behind the districting scheme.'
Ultimately,
the Court held that if the plaintiff demonstrates that race is the
predominant factor for the district's design, then strict scrutiny
applies.20 7 In order to satisfy this burden, a plaintiff may use
circumstantial evidence of a district's shape or direct evidence of the
legislature's purpose, and the plaintiff must show that the legislature
subordinated traditional race-neutral districting principles.'
Based
on shape, General Assembly statements that it was motivated by a
desire to create a majority-black district, and Justice Department
demands that the state create three majority-minority districts, the
Court concluded that the district court's finding that race represented
the predominant factor was not clearly erroneous.'
The Court then analyzed the district under the strict scrutiny
standards. It determined that the Voting Rights Act did not require this
district; thus, the Court did not conclude whether complying with the
Voting Rights Act can provide a compelling interest.2 10 The Court did
hold that complying with Department of Justice preclearance requirements does not establish a compelling interest.2
Only if Georgia
demonstrated that the drawing of this majority-black district was
necessary to counter the effects of past discrimination might the Court
have recognized a compelling interest.212 Consequently, the districting
plan violated the Equal Protection Clause.

203. Id. at 907-08. As a result of the Voting Rights Act preclearance requirement for
Georgia, the Department of Justice required that Georgia create more than two majorityminority districts, which the state originally proposed. Id. at 906-07.
204. Id. at 908.
205. Id. at 913.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 915-16.
208. Id at 916.
209. Id. at 917-18.
210. Id. at 921. The Voting Rights Act did not require this district because no
reasonable basis existed to believe that Georgia's earlier enacted plans violated section 5

of the Act. Id.
211. I& at 922.
212. Id, at 920-21.
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Justice O'Connor's concurrence, which provided the fifth vote, put a

twist on the predominant factor test. To invoke strict scrutiny, she
believed that the plaintiff must demonstrate that "the State has relied
on race in substantial disregard of customary and traditional districting
practices."21 ' Only in "extreme instances of gerrymandering" would
the Court have to apply strict scrutiny. "
During the 1996-97 Supreme Court Term, the Court ruled on several
cases involving redistricting. One of those, Lawyer v. Department of
Justice,21 provides additional guidance for the constitutionality of
majority-minority districts. In Lawyer Florida established a new
redistricting plan based on the 1990 census results. The Department of
Justice, however, denied preclearance to the Florida Senate districts
under the Voting Rights Act because it divided the minority population
and failed to create a majority-minority district in the Tampa Bay
area.2 16 Subsequently, the Florida Supreme Court ordered the legislature to adopt a new plan. When an impasse occurred, the district court
itself adopted a redistricting plan that established a majority-minority
district in the Tampa Bay area. The irregularly shaped district had a
45.8% African-American and 9.4% Hispanic voting age population from
four counties in the area. Plaintiffs filed suit claiming that this plan
violated the Equal Protection Clause. As the suit was pending, the
parties settled the suit by creating a new district. This district covered
portions of three counties instead of four and reduced the AfricanAmerican voting age population from 45.8% to 36.2%.217
The Supreme Court initially held that the state has the power to enter
into a redistricting settlement agreement before the district court has
ruled on the constitutionality of the district pending before it.218 More

importantly, however, the Court ruled that the settlement plan did not
violate the Equal Protection Clause because the shape and composition
of the district was not improper. 219 First, the district was located
entirely in the Tampa Bay region and had an area and shape similar to
other Florida Senate districts.' Second, the black voting age population was only 36.2%; thus, it would not necessarily prefer black
candidates over white candidates. 22' The district merely comprised a
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Id. at 928 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 029.
117 S. Ct. 2186 (1997).
Id. at 2189-90.
1& at 2191.
Id. at 2193.
Id. at 2195.

220. I
221. Id.
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predominantly lower-income, urban population that represented a
"community" of interests.2 '
Finally, the Court determined that
although the district's number of black voters was significantly higher
than the overall number of black voters in any of the counties from
which the district was created, this deviation did not prove fatal to the
plan.'
Justice Souter wrote that "similar racial composition of
different political districts" is not "necessary to avoid an inference of
racial gerrymandering."22' As a result, race was not a predominant
factor in the composition of the district, and the Court did not have to
apply a strict scrutiny analysis.
Through the Court's predominant factor test established in Miller, the
Court set a high standard for states in their creation of legislative
districts. However, Lawyer indicates that states are not prevented from
being race conscious in drawing district boundaries. As with conventional preference programs, race may be considered only in rare, limited
situations. If legislatures and courts consider race but also consider
goals such as preserving communities of interest, protecting incumbents,
and using county or precinct lines, the plan has a good chance of passing
constitutional muster. A greater problem results when minorities are
widely dispersed as in Shaw and Miller. In these situations it becomes
more difficult to craft a district that is concerned about race without
violating the Equal Protection Clause. Following the 2000 census, the
Court may have the opportunity to address this issue further.

VII.

CONCLUSION
Recently, the courts have taken an increasingly hostile approach to
affirmative action programs. Because all racial classifications for
preference programs are subject to strict scrutiny, a preference plan will
survive only if it furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored.
Over the years the Supreme Court has become more conservative in
what it recognizes as a compelling interest. Only when the plan seeks
to remedy the present effects of past discrimination as shown by specific
evidence in the area in which the program is applied will the courts
clearly find a compelling interest. This evidentiary standard is difficult
to reach as the preceding cases indicate. Furthermore, the Court has not
embraced Justice Powell's diversity rationale that he promulgated in
Bakke. Metro Broadcasting,which considered diversity an important
government interest, has been rejected through Croson's and Adarand's
establishment of strict scrutiny. Based on the Court's current composi222. I&
223. Id.
224. Id.
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tion, a vote on racial diversity as a compelling interest likely would
result in a five-to-four decision against diversity, with Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas in the
majority and Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer dissenting.' Similarly, if the current Court hears a case similar to Coalition
for Economic Equity addressing a ban on affirmative action, to Hopwood
addressing the validity of preferential admissions programs, or to
Taxman addressing affirmative action plans in hiring, the Court likely
would uphold a prohibition on affirmative action or strike the preferential program.
In the areas of contracting, public employment, university admissions,
and even districting, the courts have established a rigid framework for
responding to the interests of minorities. Based on this evolving case
law, rarely can a preference program withstand a court's scrutiny. In
fact, only in extraordinary circumstances might a program survive. As
EngineeringContractorsand ContractorsAss'n illustrate, it is exceedingly difficult for a plaintiff to provide evidence sufficient to illustrate past
discrimination within a particular construction industry. Without this
showing a contracting program virtually has no chance of withstanding
a court's analysis. Even if a plaintiff meets this burden, the plaintiff
also must establish that the program is narrowly tailored. Because
entities often implement preference plans under the mandate of local or
state government, in many instances these entities have not experimented with less intrusive or race-neutral measures. Consequently, the
narrow tailoring criteria becomes an additional stumbling block. To
further dissuade the use of preference programs, Coalitionfor Economic
Equity paves the way for other states, and even the federal government,
to completely prohibit the use of affirmative action plans in public
employment.
With the goal of diversity no longer accepted by the courts, the same
high burden in the realm of contracting and hiring awaits preference
programs in public higher education. Unless colleges and universities
develop new plans that will promote minority enrollment without
violating constitutional mandates, the numbers of minorities in the
classroom could drop. Nevertheless, to achieve some diversity, universities will be forced to adopt race-neutral measures such as looking at
economic disadvantage when admitting students. These race-neutral
measures, however, may lack the effectiveness of preferential admissions
programs in creating diverse student bodies and providing minorities
greater access to higher education.
225. Robert J. Donahue, Note, RacialDiversityas a Compelling GovernmentalInterest,
30 IND. L. REV. 523, 549 (1997).
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Even in the realm of legislative districting, it remains difficult to
create a district that is geared to minority interests. When the sole
focus of the district is race, a court most likely will order a redrawing of
the district. Although some of the gerrymandered districts have verged
on the extreme, the impact, of not considering race could be reflected in
the composition of Congress and various state legislatures.
While debate continues to persist over the efficacy and need for
affirmative action and preference programs, the net result is likely to be
a stagnation of the racial composition of schools, public payrolls, and
governing bodies. This Comment does not attempt to address the
positive or negative impact of racial preferences or whether affirmative
action plans should be scrapped, but it does conclude that the Court's
current course reduces the ability to create diversity in the public realm.
Under the current framework, rarely will a court recognize the
importance of diversity.
As the current political climate continues to question the significance
of preference programs, many state legislatures, and possibly Congress,
may soon pass legislation modeled on California's Proposition 209. If
this indeed happens, a good chance exists that the Supreme Court will
address the constitutionality of these laws. Similarly, the Court may
choose to hear a case similar to Tbxman. But until that time, the
continued viability of preference programs appears grim.
JEREMY MOESER

